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IMAGINARY BOTTLES1
JESSICA LITMAN†

i.
In 1994, John Perry Barlow published The Economy of Ideas in
WIRED magazine.2 Subtitled “A Framework for patents and copyrights
in the Digital Age (everything you know about intellectual property is
wrong),” the article argued that commercializing copyrighted material in
a digital age was akin to selling wine without bottles.
Barlow’s metaphor was startlingly apt. For more than 200 years,
U.S. copyright law had defined the rights of both owners and users
primarily by regulating the creation and distribution of the tangible objects
in which copyrighted works were embodied.3 Networked digital
technology enabled the promiscuous copying and broad distribution of
works completely detached from tangible objects.
The enigma is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced and
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can we
protect it? . . . . 4
1

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives
4.0 International License (CC BY-ND 4.0).
†
John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of
Michigan. Jon Weinberg made extremely helpful comments on earlier versions
of this essay.
2
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994), reprinted
as Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global Net, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019).
3
See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for
Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 581 (1986); L. Ray Patterson,
Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 33
(1993); R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital
Networks, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 577, 583–610 (2003). As Barlow noted, the 20th
century dissemination of works using the broadcast spectrum had also posed a
wine-without-bottles problem, but most practical uses of broadcasting involved
the creation of copies. Live television and radio programming received no
copyright protection at all until the program was embodied in a tangible object.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102 (2012); Barlow, supra note 2, at 91, 18 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. at 19 (“[B]roadcast transmissions all lack the Constitutional
requirement of fixation as a ‘writing.’”).
4
Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8 (as “[t]he riddle is
this . . .”).
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Barlow’s answer was that we needed to reexamine our
assumptions about the value and nature of the information that copyright
law seeks to secure. Once that authorship was detached from its
containers, it would no longer work to assume that container-centric
regulation would treat it appropriately.
Some of Barlow’s initial musings on the nature and value of
information seem startlingly prescient 25 years later. His prediction that,
in the near future, “information will be generated collaboratively by the
cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace,”5 was an eerily accurate
description of Twitter. Barlow’s suggestion that information itself was
supplanting money as our dominant currency6 presaged a future ruled by
Google, Facebook, and Amazon, three companies that derive much of their
monetary value from trafficking in information. He proposed that we
reconceptualize information in the networked digital environment as more
akin to a living organism than a static package of knowledge. As a noncarbon-based life form, Barlow suggested, information evolves, spreads,
and, over time, it spoils. It creates relationships and meaning. Some
information’s value depends on exclusivity; other information is worth
more the more common it becomes.7
Legacy owners of intellectual property, he complained, were
engaging in futile efforts to buttress the old, container-centric rules to
enable them to stretch around the new reality. He predicted that the
disconnect between traditional copyright law and digital technology would
prove to be unbridgeable:
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or
expanded to contain digitized expression any more than real estate
law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting spectrum
(which, in fact, rather resembles what is being attempted here). We
will need to develop an entirely new set of methods as befits this
entirely new set of circumstances.8

Twenty-five years later, though, it appears that Barlow might have
underestimated the tenacity of legacy copyright owners. Despite
significant missteps, bad bets, and massive investment in stupid initiatives,
they seem to have emerged into a new world where, from their vantage

5

Barlow, supra note 2, at 90, 18 DUKE L. & TEC. REV. at 19.
See Barlow, supra note 2, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24
(“[Information] may become the dominant form of human trade.”).
7
See Barlow, supra note 2, at 89–90, 126–27, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 19–
21.
8
Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 9.
6
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point, the copyright rules are startlingly similar to the rules that governed
the old world, only better.

ii.
Initially, copyright owners relied on a combination of two
strategies. First, they put their hopes in what Barlow described as “crypto
bottling.”9 Second, they backed up that plan with hefty helpings of
relentless litigation. In the 1990s, many lobbyists for legacy copyright
businesses insisted that, although consumers might enjoy content created
by amateurs if it were free, the only good reason for a consumer to pay for
Internet access would be to enjoy commercially-produced entertainment
and information products. It followed that one could make a profit from
providing Internet access by selling subscriptions to consumers eager for
that content. If copyright owners could prevent consumers from gaining
unlicensed access or making unlicensed copies, they'd be able to charge
them lots of money for licensed access. They figured that devising a
technological system to prevent unauthorized access or use was just
around the corner, and if hacking technological protection were unlawful,
that would effectively deter folks from piracy.
Copyright lobbyists persuaded Congress to protect copyright on
the Internet by enacting a law that made it illegal to circumvent copy
protection technology for any reason.10 Then, they sat back and waited
impatiently for software engineers to invent technology that could encase
copyrighted works in impregnable containers of encryption code. And
waited. Meanwhile, they delayed making their works available online.
While they were waiting, they sued upstart businesses that dared to offer
music or video over the Internet, or even to help consumers do it
themselves.11 Book publishers, movie studios and record labels were
reluctant to launch less-secure offerings, and wary of cannibalizing their

9

See Barlow, supra note 2, at 129, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 28.
See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998).
11
See, e.g., MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005); UMG Recordings v.
Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011); Arista Records, L.L.C.
v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Warner Bros. Entm’t v. WTV
Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal 2011); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. HummerWinblad, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta
Books L.L.C, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir.
2002); UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1831 (W.D. Pa.
2000).
10
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existing bricks-and-mortar business models.12 When they finally made
their works available over digital networks, they offered pallid and
overpriced digital services with terrible user interfaces, often constrained
by extremely buggy and annoying digital rights management technology.13
So, there was a bunch of pent-up demand and no real competition when a
few well-capitalized businesses decided it was worth the litigation risk to
enter the digital market with offerings of their own. Apple, Amazon, and
Google soon became providers of online music, books, and video. They
were willing to defend expensive lawsuits, and faced very little
competition. Soon, all three had become obligatory partners for content
owners hoping to distribute their works online. Online platforms figured
out that they could make more money by selling eyeballs to advertisers
than they could by selling movies to viewers or music to listeners. Apple,
Amazon, and Google then proceeded to become impossibly wealthy.14
Copyright owners resent that. They've coined the term “value
gap” to describe the injustice of the fact that platforms have too much
bargaining power and can therefore shape the terms of copyright licenses
to call for lower royalty payments than copyright owners believe they
ought to pay.15 It isn't that platforms don't purchase licenses for the
copyrighted content that appears on their services––they do. Because of
their market dominance, though, they have the upper hand in negotiations
and can insist on paying lower royalties than copyright owners believe
would be fair. Given how much money the big online platforms are raking
in, copyright owners figure they ought to be sharing a bigger piece of it.16
Of course, we know now that all of the assumptions underlying
the impenetrable crypto-bottle strategy were misguided. There was never
going to be an impregnable crypto-bottle.17 The electronic game industry
has managed to make good-enough encryption work, but for owners of
12

See, e.g., ANDREW ALBANESE, THE BATTLE OF $9.99 (2013).
See Jessica Litman, Antibiotic Resistance, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53,
53–58 (2012).
14
See id. at 58–66.
15
See American Assoc. of Independent Music et al., Joint Comments before the
US Copyright Office in re Section 512 Study, No. 2015-7 (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-89806; Warner
Music Group, Comments before the US Copyright Office in re Section 512
Study, No. 2015-7 (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-86022.
16
See Jessica Litman, What We Don’t See When We See Copyright as Property,
77 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 536, 537–42 (2018).
17
See CORY DOCTOROW, INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE FREE: LAWS FOR
THE INTERNET AGE (2014).
13
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copyrights in other works, the legal prohibition on hacking copyprotection technology has been a bust.18 The additional deterrent effect of
making it illegal to circumvent digital rights management turned out to be
negligible. Moreover, the prohibition is so broadly worded that it seems
to forbid an independent mechanic from fixing any car containing
software,19 so people tend not to believe that the behavior it prohibits is
unlawful. Anyone can find easy-to-follow circumvention instructions in
respectable newspapers and online magazines; circumvention software is
ubiquitous.20 Several major media companies have decided not to bother
with digital rights management protection at all, since it costs them
something to encode every copy, and that encoding doesn't in fact provide
meaningful protection.
As the crypto-bottle strategy failed, though, copyright owners
stumbled into a second tactic that has been far more effective. The key to
this approach was a breathtakingly expansive reinterpretation of the
exclusive right to reproduce a work in copies, predicated on a very broad
definition of “copy.”21 Fans of this new understanding maintain that
whenever a work appears in the working memory of any computer
anywhere, an actionable copy has been made, in violation of the statutory
reproduction right.22 By insisting, again and again, that the word “copy”
had long been understood in this broader sense, and by behaving as if they
were right about that, copyright owners were able to persuade some courts
that the copyright law, if properly interpreted, afforded them extensive
18

See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2010).
See Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg.
54010, 54021-23 (Oct. 26, 2018) (discussing proposed exemption “allowing for
circumvention of access controls controlling the functioning of motorized land
vehicles for purposes of diagnosis, repair, or lawful modification of a vehicle”).
20
See, e.g., Catherine Ellis, The Best Free DVD Copier 2019, TECHRADAR (Feb.
11, 2019), https://www.techradar.com/best/the-best-free-dvd-copier; Kirk
McElhearn, How To Rip DVDs and Blu-Ray Discs with Make MKV and
Handbrake, MACWORLD (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://www.macworld.com/article/3179350/how-to-rip-dvds-and-blu-ray-discswith-makemkv-and-handbrake.html; MacTheRipper, GUSTAVUS ADOPHUS
COLLEGE, https://gustavus.edu/gts/Mac_the_Ripper (last visited Mar. 6, 2019).
21
See Jessica Litman, Fetishizing Copies, in RUTH OKEDIJI, COPYRIGHT IN AN
AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 107 (2017).
22
See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 96–112 (2002) (testimony of Emery Simon, Business Software Alliance);
see generally Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1067 (2010).
19
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rights to control any appearance of their works over digital networks.
The new definition requires some mental gymnastics for readers
who pay attention to statutory language. The copyright statute has, since
1976, defined “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is fixed.”23
Congress hasn’t revised that definition, and copyright owners haven’t
asked Congress to do so. Being attached to a material object, though, is
precisely the characteristic that Barlow argued that digital files lack. The
modern revisionist interpretation expands the understanding of a “copy”
beyond the idea of a tangible material object to include temporary and
ephemeral instantiations. Essentially, it reads the words “material objects”
out of the statutory definition.24
Over the past 20 years, this expanded meaning of “copy” has
ceased to be seen as radical.25 That has allowed copyright owners to sell
their wine in what I would call make-believe bottles. Like the digital
instantiations of the works, these imaginary bottles are not tangible. That
lack has turned out to carry with it unexpected advantages for rights
holders. Because the bottles are made-up creations, copyright owners can
imbue them with whatever characteristics they fancy. By encoding
23

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Most defenses of the expanded conception of “copy” focus only on the
wording of the definition of “fixation,” which imposes the additional
requirement that the work’s instantiation in a material object must be
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17
U.S.C. § 101. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (Dec. 12 & 13, 2001) [hereinafter Section 104 Hearing] (statement
of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). They assume that since computers
and computer memory chips are themselves material objects, any time
expression occupies a memory chip for a period of more than transitory
duration, a copy has been made. Proponents of the view that RAM copies
infringe copyrights argue that as long as the computer or other machine is on—
and it could be on indefinitely—a copy of the copyrighted work stored there can
be perceived or reproduced, thereby satisfying the “more than transitory
duration” standard. By that logic, a broadcast tower is a material object, an
unrecorded live television broadcast would therefore necessarily result in a
copy, and Congress’s conclusion that it did not must have been mistaken. See
Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NII Intellectual Property Report,
COMM. ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21, 23 (“[H]olding a mirror up to a book would be
infringement because the book’s image could be perceived there for more than
transitory duration.”).
25
See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT,
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 12 (2013).
24
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restrictions in the terms of an end user license agreement, distributors of
copyrighted works have succeeded in limiting the uses consumers are
permitted to make of lawful copies of copyrighted works.26 It has become
conventional for copyright owners to insist that digital copies are
“licensed,” not “sold,” even in transactions that are expressly denominated
as sales.27 Because the terms of the license may permit or forbid any
encounter with the work that results in a digital copy, the licensor is
entitled to subject the purchaser’s use to whatever conditions it chooses to
impose. In particular, copyright owners have insisted that their makebelieve bottles are not subject to the first sale doctrine, and the purchasers
of those bottles may not pass them on to new owners.28 That’s a neat trick:
a digital file may be a copy for the purpose of infringement liability but
not a copy for the purpose of transferring ownership.
Copyright owners have even persuaded some courts that their
entitlement to denominate transactions as licenses rather than sales also
permits them to characterize transfers of physical media containing
copyrighted works as licenses of the material objects that may preclude
the purchaser from transferring the material object.29
26

The topic of the use of end user license agreements to negate user’s rights
under copyright law is much too involved and important for this short essay.
Peggy Radin and Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz have published
excellent books with masterful discussions of the ramifications. See AARON
PERZANOWSKI & JASON SHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP (2016); MARGARET
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE (2012).
27
See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Even Amazon Can’t Keep Its EULA Story Straight,
BOING BOING (Jan. 12, 2010), https://boingboing.net/2010/01/12/even-amazoncant-kee.html.
28
See, e.g., First Sale Doctrine, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance
.org/policy/position-papers/first-sale-doctrine/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2019); Amici
Curiae Brief of Motion Picture Ass’n of America & Recording Industry Ass’n of
America at 7–9, Capitol Records v. Redigi, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018) (No.
16-2321), https://copyrightalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ReDigiRIAA-Amicus-Brief.pdf; see generally First Sale Under Title 17: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the H. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong. (June
2, 2014), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20140602/102290/HHRG113-JU03-Transcript-20140602.pdf.
29
Compare Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2010), with UMG
Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). In Disney Enterprises v.
Redbox Automated Retail, Disney claimed that language on the outside of its
boxed blu-ray disk, DVD, and digital download code combo packs that said
“codes are not for sale or transfer” and “this product . . . cannot be sold or rented
individually,” bound purchasers of the combo packs. Redbox purchased combo
packs and sold the three components separately. Disney claimed that a consumer
who purchased a download code from Redbox infringed its copyright when she
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Twenty years ago, proponents of the broad reconstruction of
“copy” argued that the expansive understanding was an essential tool to
prevent digital piracy, but acknowledged that the law should find some
way to allow temporary digital copies that were incidental to legitimate
uses.30 Today, the fact that an otherwise legitimate use requires the
creation of a unauthorized digital copy is itself enough to make the use
illegitimate.31

iii.
In 2019, then, make-believe copyright bottles have given
copyright owners more legal control over uses of their works than they
enjoyed under the old-fangled bricks-and-mortar law. That enhanced legal
control hasn’t necessarily translated into actual control, but the businesses
that call themselves the “core copyright industries” report that they are
earning more money than ever,32 so things seem to be working out okay
for them so far.
Was Barlow wrong about the intellectual property crisis? He
predicted in 1994 that the extant system of IP law would fall under its own
weight:
It’s fairly paradigm warping to look at information through fresh eyes
––to see how very little it is like pig iron or pork bellies, and to
or he downloaded the movie, and that Redbox should be held liable as a
contributory infringer. The court initially ruled that the language did not create
an enforceable contract, both because it didn’t indicate that opening the box
would constitute assent and because the purported prohibition on transfer of
BluRay discs and DVDs sought to impose an unenforceable condition in
contravention of the first sale doctrine in section 109. Indeed, the district court
concluded that the overreaching terms of the purported license should be
considered copyright misuse. See Disney Enters. v. Redbox Automated Retail,
No. CV 17-08655 DDP (AGRx), 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 61903 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
20, 2018). Disney revised the language to give purchasers clearer notice on the
outside of the combo pack box and added lengthy terms and conditions to its
digital download site. The court agreed that Disney could now succeed on its
claim that Redbox encouraged its customers to infringe Disney’s copyrights by
using the digital download, and entered a preliminary injunction. See Disney
Enters. v. Redbox Automated Retail, 336 F. Supp 3d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
30
See, e.g., Section 104 Hearing, supra note 24 (statement of Mary Beth Peters,
Register of Copyrights); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE , DMCA SECTION 104
REP. 106-48 (Aug. 2001).
31
See Capitol Records v. Redigi, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018).
32
See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE
2018 REPORT (2018), https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/
copyright-industry-report-wm.pdf.
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imagine the tottering travesties of case law we will stack up if we go
on legally treating it as though it were.
As I’ve said, I believe these towers of outmoded boilerplate will
be a smoking heap sometime in the next decade, and we mind miners
will have no choice but to cast our lot with new systems that work.33

That didn’t happen, or, at least, it didn’t happen in that way or in
that time frame. Most of what was idiotic and counterproductive about the
ways that copyright law worked in 1994 is still idiotic and
counterproductive in 2019. If the purpose of copyright law is to
compensate creators for the products of their minds,34 it hasn’t yet come
close to achieving that goal.35 Oodles of money flood into the copyright
system. Most of that money is siphoned off before it reaches creators’
pockets, and where and why the money goes where it goes is kept a closely
guarded secret.36 Creators across a wide swathe of fields complain of a
shocking lack of transparency. Proposals to replace the current system
with “new systems that work” have so far failed to attract enough support
to make them feasible.
Yet Barlow’s musings about the organic and volatile nature of
information remain compelling; they seem even truer today than they
seemed 25 years ago. Remove information from its containers and it
spills. Spills spread. As different individual creators and researchers
discover closely-held details of how money and rights move through the
copyright system,37 that knowledge may itself transform the ways that
copyright owners do business. Recent statutory amendments include
33

Barlow, supra note 2, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24.
See Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8.
35
I’ve discussed this problem elsewhere. See Litman, supra note 16, at 539–50;
Litman, supra note 18, at 8–12.
36
See, e.g., Peter C. DiCola & David Touve, Licensing in the Shadow of
Copyright, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 397 (2014); Eriq Gardner, Fox Rocked by
$179M ‘Bones’ Ruling: Lying, Cheating and “Reprehensible” Studio Fraud,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/fox-rocked-by-179-million-bones-ruling-lying-cheating-reprehensiblestudio-fraud-1190346; Eriq Gardner, ‘Walking Dead’ Producers Say AMC
Won’t Explain Basis for Denying Hundreds of Millions in Profits, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/walking-deadproducers-say-amc-wont-explain-basis-denying-hundreds-millions-profits1192470.
37
See, e.g., Zoe Keating, Another Year, TUMBLR, http://zoekeating.tumblr.com/
post/181269142164/another-year (last visited Mar. 9, 2019); Daniel Sanchez,
What Spotify Paid One Artist in 2018, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/12/19/zoe-keating-spotify-2018payout/.
34
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provisions designed to encourage music and sound recording rights
holders to disclose more data about the works they control;38 secrets
revealed as a result of publicized legal disputes have shone light on the
ways that some rights-holders conceal facts about their earnings and
payment.39 Even if the heavily fortified legacy copyright system fails to
crumble under its own weight, a flood of newly revealed information may
enable the rest of us to piece together a truer picture of where and how the
system is failing, and what interventions might help creators to wrest back
some control, or at least some money, from the legacy rights holders
seeking to preserve the old regime.

38

See Hatch-Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264 (2018).
Cynics suggest that the incentives in the new law will not suffice to persuade
major music publishers and labels to give up their secrets.
39
See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Wark Ent., Inc., Amended
Final Award, No. 1220052735 (JAMS Feb. 20, 2019) (Liu, Arb.),
https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/final-amended-awardredactions.pdf.

